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7Martin Heidegger famously criticized science and scientific practice for being 
part of what he called Ge-Stell. Ge-stell was the name he gave to that which he 
saw to be at the very kernel of a structure that determined the metaphysical 
structure of the Occident. This metaphysical structure – Grundstellung as Hei-
degger called it – led in Heidegger’s view to complete obliviousness with regard 
to the most crucial question, the question of being. One of the motors behind 
this forgetting, if not the most essential, was science. And the nature of science 
in this account has to be understood as a very refined version of technology. It 
is technology that empowers human beings – namely as subjects – to put any 
thinkable being in front of themselves  (this is the operation of Vor-Stellung typi-
cal of Ge-Stell) and force it to take the form and shape they desire. Via scientific 
technology, being has come to be at subjects’ disposal, and subjects themselves 
become, as already Protagoras contended, the measure of all things. But at the 
same time, these subjects, being also subjected to this procedure of a metaphys-
ical tailoring of being, are also subjected to a radical forgetting – the forget-
ting of being qua being (which in the last instance even implies forgetting that 
one has forgotten). Science, which is, according to Heidegger, just a condensed 
embodiment of technology, is nothing more than one of the worst outcomes of 
this subjectivizing process that is essential for western metaphysical subjectiv-
ity and its peculiar obliviousness. The slogan Heidegger found for this analysis 
was: science does not think. 
The present issue of Filozofski Vestnik starts from a concatenation – science and 
thought – that at first sight is the radical opposite to Heidegger’s diagnosis. The 
title of this issue, “Science and Thought”, already suggests that there is or at 
least there can be such a relation. With regard to Heidegger, this implies two op-
tions here: either Heidegger was wrong in his criticism of metaphysics or he was 
wrong with his equation of Ge-Stell (as the essence of technology) and science. 
Simply put: either metaphysics still contains some sort of valuable thought (and 
hence there could be some sort of metaphysical science that thinks) or science 
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is simply not reducible to the metaphysics or to the being of a mere technology 
in the sense that Heidegger criticized. Then the (metaphysical) question of be-
ing could be separated from technology and metaphysics, but perhaps it still 
finds its locus rather within science. Heidegger’s claim about metaphysics and 
technology then would find itself inverted through the suggested relation of sci-
ence and thought. Such an inversion of Heidegger’s critique of the very status of 
science is itself conditioned by the recent developments in philosophy that we 
take as the starting point for the present issue of Filozosfki Vestnik. 
While for the analytic tradition of philosophy and specifically the philosophy 
of mind – a tradition which one might contend has developed in opposition to 
Heidegger’s critique of technology – science has played an important role more 
or less throughout, the continental philosophy following Heidegger only rarely 
broke with his hostility towards the sciences. The sciences have been attacked 
under the name of positivism (even by self-proclaimed Anti-Heideggerians, 
such as Adorno) for presenting simple state-of-affairs accounts of things as they 
are and thereby (even worse) politically served any conservative apologetics (by 
diminishing practical freedom, as well as freedom of thought). In recent devel-
opments, though, science has taken a step forward into the focus of continen-
tal streams of philosophy. Philosophy therein seeks to understand science as 
a proper means of its reasoning, an adequate resource for actualizing its own 
structures and tools or even (again) as the ideal discourse from which philoso-
phy has to learn how to proceed. The sciences – not only mathematics (for ex-
ample, in the case of Alain Badiou), but also quantum physics (for example, in 
the case of Slavoj Žižek) and other scientific disciplines – started again to play a 
crucial role in and for philosophy. Thus, either this marks a return of metaphys-
ics to philosophy or things are different than what one might think according to 
Heidegger. 
From here on, two questions can be asked: if one does not want to understand 
philosophy as the sole explanation of the given, but rather as a thinking of the 
inexistent, potential, virtual, unseen – how can philosophy rely on science 
without giving in to its insistence on the factual? And does science necessarily 
refer to a factual and objective foundation on which it operates?  Thus, the ques-
tion of science and thought fundamentally appears as a question of philosophy 
and science, but not only this: it also becomes a question of what place philoso-
phy has in its relation to science. One might even be tempted to ask if there is 
FV_02_2012.indd   8 16. 12. 12   21:54
9introduction: science and thought
something more in science than science alone that only philosophy is able to 
uncover.
All this offers three possible options: (1) Science does not think and thus has en-
dorsed this obliviousness, perhaps even obstruction of thought. Science could 
therefore still become an object of thought, but will never be an active thought 
in itself. To think science, then, is to comprehend what interrupts thinking, what 
hinders or endangers thought as such (as Heidegger did); thus the question of 
science and thought finds itself reduced to the question of thought and its ob-
ject. One of the objects of thought might be science, but science itself cannot 
think. (2) Science is thought and what needs to be explained is the how and 
why of its practice. This account entails that “science” is not just another word 
for “thought” in general, but rather that science is one specific way, one pecu-
liar kind of thought. To think science, then, is to think a specific and particular 
manner of thinking. (3) This leads to the third option: Science is thought, but 
there are also other versions of thought and not only scientific ones (e.g. philo-
sophical or political thoughts). This means that to think science is to think not 
only one specific manner of thinking, but also the relationship between differ-
ent forms of thought. It implies having a more general concept of thought in 
which the specificity of scientific thought can be thought in its difference and 
compossibility with other forms. This third option may be expanded to a fourth, 
generalized option: (4) There is a science of thought. This then either implies 
(4.1) that science does not think but it has thought; thinking processes are its 
object (one might here refer to certain neurosciences, for example), or (4.2) that 
science does think and what it thinks is thought itself – in its generality. In this 
version the very model of scientific thought becomes the paradigm for thinking 
thought tout court, which is also why this option has been a widespread defini-
tion of philosophy; philosophy being the only form of practice of thought that is 
able to fulfill this very definition (recall, for example, Hegel’s Science of Logic). 
The articles collected in this issue will take very different paths through the as-
pects considered above. Nevertheless, they all share a common point of depar-
ture: There is a relation between science and thought that needs to be rethought. 
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